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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at providing a conceptual distinction between banking and insurance with 
regard to systemic regulation. It discusses key differences and similarities as to how both 
sectors interact with the financial system. Insurers interact as financial intermediaries and 
through financial market investments, but do not share the features of banking that give rise to 
particular systemic risk in that sector, such as the institutional interconnectedness through the 
interbank market, the maturity transformation combined with leverage, the prevalence of 
liquidity risk and the operation of the payment system. The paper also draws attention to three 
salient features in insurance that need to be taken account in systemic regulation: the quasi-
absence of leverage, the fundamentally different role of capital and the ‘built-in bail-in’ of a 
significant part of insurance liabilities through policy-holder participation. Based on these 
considerations, the paper argues that if certain activities were to give rise to concerns about 
systemic risk in the case of insurers, regulatory responses other than capital surcharges may 
be more appropriate.  
 
 
  
                                                          
1
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Executive Summary 
The process of global regulation of systemically important financial institutions is still in full 
swing. Having completed the regulatory framework for systemically important banks, the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) is turning to insurance companies.  
 
In 2013, the FSB designated nine insurance companies as systemically important, and it is 
now in the process of designing systemic regulation for the industry, supported by the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
 
The framework that the FSB has established for insurers closely resembles its framework for 
banks, culminating in the design of capital standards and the calibration of capital surcharges. 
This parallel treatment of banks and insurers is also found in a number of important 
contributions on systemic risk in the academic literature. 
 
This paper challenges this approach. It focuses on the distinct business models and balance 
sheet structures, outlining the main differences and similarities between banks and insurers 
with regard to their interaction with the financial system. 
 
The paper identifies four differences and two similarities. It highlights that: banks are 
institutionally connected with each other through the interbank market, whereas insurers are 
stand-alone operators; banks engage in maturity transformation whereas insurers aim to match 
the duration of assets and liabilities; banks are inherently liquidity-short, whereas insurers are 
inherently liquidity-rich; and banks create money, credit and handle the payment system, 
which insurers do not. The two similarities are that both kinds of institutions are financial 
intermediaries and large-scale investors in financial markets. 
 
The differences underscore the fact that banks have a fundamentally different role within the 
financial system and systemic risk. They can be seen as operating in an “inner circle” of the 
financial system that is given by the banking system, whereas insurers operate in an “outer 
circle”, connected to other financial institutions essentially through their financial market 
investments. 
 
The paper also highlights the fundamental differences between insurers and banks in terms of 
leverage, the role of capital and their capacity for loss absorbency – three critical issues for 
systemic regulation. Leverage is inherent in banking, but quasi-absent in insurance. Capital in 
banking plays an immediate role in case of stress to absorb shocks and retain funding 
capacity; in insurance, capital serves to ensure that the last policy-holders are paid. Loss 
absorbency for banks is essentially limited to equity, but for insurers an additional loss 
absorbency capacity exists in the form of participation by policy-holders, who may share part 
of asset fluctuations and potential losses. 
 
Based on this analysis, the paper raises the question of whether capital surcharges are an 
appropriate instrument for regulating insurers as they may be for banks. Whereas for banks, 
capital surcharges may be helpful in controlling leverage, raising buffers and augmenting 
shock absorption capacity, these effects are not prevalent in insurance. If certain issues were 
to give rise to systemic risk in insurance, other policy tools to address these concerns may be 
more appropriate. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Regulation of the insurance industry is entering a new era. The global regulatory community 
under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is contemplating regulatory 
standards for insurance groups that it deems to be of systemic importance. Nine insurance 
groups received this classification by the FSB in 2013, and the design of systemic regulation 
for these groups is now in progress.  
 
The framework that the FSB has rolled out for systemically important insurers is virtually 
identical to its framework for systemically important banks. The identification criteria are 
largely the same, and so are the envisaged policy measures: enhanced group-wide 
supervision; preparation of crisis management tools; and possible higher capital charges for 
some activities. 
 
There may be an inclination to consider institutions that provide financial services to the 
general public, that invest heavily in financial securities and that are publicly listed companies 
as being close to banks. And there may even be a temptation to bring insurance and banking 
closely together from a systemic perspective: after all, do the asset structures not resemble 
each other, and are the liabilities towards policy-holders not somehow comparable to those 
towards depositors? Are the two sectors not also closely interconnected through cross-
holdings of securities? And would insurance companies not have been ‘the next in line’ to fall 
in the global financial crisis, if the banks had not been saved?  
 
These questions overlook the fact that insurance companies have a fundamentally different 
business model and interact with each other and the financial system in a way that is very 
different from banks. Moreover, some of the issues that are at the core of systemic risk control 
– leverage, capital and loss absorbency capacity – are fundamentally different.  
 
This means that applying bank-based or bank-inspired regulation to insurers has the potential 
of being flawed. The fact that prudential regulations for the two sectors – the Basel 
framework on the one hand and the European Solvency II framework or the US Risk-Based-
Capital framework on the other hand – are entirely different is further testimony to the 
fundamental differences between the two sectors.  
 
The project of systemic insurance regulation raises significant issues for both the industry and 
the regulators. The industry is concerned about the costs of doing business, about distortions 
in the global level playing field – given that European and US accounting and regulatory 
standards are literally continents apart – and about the rising complexity of internal financial 
management, when national and global standards move in different directions. 
 
The regulators are concerned about the appropriateness and effectiveness of regulation, and 
about avoiding inconsistency, excessive complexity and competitive distortions. Questions of 
what possible capital implications are meant to achieve, how they would fit with local 
regulatory requirements and how they affect the competitive position of the systemically 
important companies vis-à-vis all other companies are considerations of critical importance. 
 
Given what is at stake, a number of topics are likely to resurface in the upcoming regulatory 
debate, including those that are seemingly settled; they even include the definition of systemic 
risk, the criteria for designating individual institutions and the lessons from the experience of 
the insurance sector during the crisis. There is still confusion about whether the focus of 
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regulation should be on a “firm-to-system” or “system-to-firm” perspective in terms of the 
direction of risk. And it is often unclear whether the core concern is systemic risk, i.e. 
negative spillover between individual institutions and the system, or systemic role, i.e. threats 
to the provision of essential services for the financial system or the economy. The policy 
implications from the various approaches are clearly not the same.  
 
This paper aims to clarify some of the main differences and similarities between insurance 
and banking with regard to systemic interaction. It is structured as follows. Section II outlines 
the FSB approach concerning the systemic regulation of insurers and presents the main 
analytical literature that discusses insurance with regard to systemic risk. Section III 
elaborates on the main differences and similarities between banking and insurance with regard 
to systemic interaction, and it develops the different roles of leverage, capital and risk 
absorbency as regards both sectors. Section IV raises some of the broader questions in the 
policy debate that are likely to resurface; and Section V concludes.  
 
 
II. Banks and insurers: business models and systemic regulation  
 
Banks and insurers have different economic functions. Banks create value by maturity 
transformation of deposits and debt into loans and other financial assets, through which they 
provide credit to the economy. Insurers provide risk protection to policy-holders in exchange 
for a premium. They provide such protection through the pooling, diversification and 
management of risk, focusing essentially on life insurance and savings; and property and 
casualty insurance.  
In terms of size, the banking sector is typically four to five times as large as the insurance 
sector; in the euro area, banks’ balance sheets amount to 330% of GDP, those of insurers to 
about 70% of GDP. Banks’ debt outstanding in absolute terms is about 15 times as high as 
debt issued by insurers. Banks’ assets are dominated by credit provision; their liabilities, by 
deposits. Insurers’ assets are dominated by financial market investment; their liabilities by 
policy holder liabilities that are also called technical reserves (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Stylized balance sheet of banks and insurers compared 
 
 
 
Note: Main balance sheet components of the euro area’s aggregated banking system and insurance sector. The size of each 
box corresponds to the relative weight on the balance sheet. The total absolute values shown also include external assets and 
liabilities, fixed assets, and other assets and liabilities that are not represented for the sake of simplicity. A unit-linked 
insurance plan is a type of life insurance where the value of a policy is linked to the net asset value of the underlying 
investment and where customers are allotted units, like in a mutual fund. Source: ECB. 
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1. Systemic regulation of banks and insurers compared  
 
The FSB designated nine insurance companies as systemically important in mid-2013 and has 
laid out its approach to the regulation of these companies.2 This approach is deeply inspired 
by its framework applied to systemic banks, and follows an identical outline (Table 1).  
 
In a first step, systemically important institutions were identified based on their size, 
interconnectedness and the degree of substitutability of their services.3 The global size of 
insurers was measured by the volume of assets, revenues and number of countries served; the 
interconnectedness was measured by the holdings of intra-financial assets and liabilities,4 the 
use of reinsurance, derivatives and other factors. The concepts of substitutability and 
complexity were essentially translated into a new concept of “non-traditional non-insurance 
activities (NTNI)”, which included items such as revenues from sources other than policy-
holders, the provision of financial guarantees, the provision of guarantees on certain life 
insurance products, the use of short-term funding and other variables. The definition of this 
last category is still rather fuzzy and the list of items in this category is still changing. 
Potentially, the coverage is very large. If variable annuities with certain life guarantees were 
included, it would cover a very large share of the US life insurance market.  
 
At present, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is charged to work 
out the specifics as regards capital regulation and definition of NTNI-activities, for which the 
first feedback is expected in autumn 2014.  
 
Table 1. FSB framework for systemic banks and insurers compared 
 
Source: Financial Stability Board (2012, 2013), author’s compilation.  
                                                          
2
 The nine companies are from the European Union (Allianz, Aviva, AXA, Generali and Prudential UK), from 
the United States (AIG, MetLife and Prudential US) and from China (Ping An).  
3
 The lesser the degree of substitutability, i.e. the possibility of other institutions taking over the service provided 
by the institution under consideration, the more systemic is its role. Market concentration indices are taken as a 
proxy for the degree of substitutability, reinforcing the size component in the overall assessment.  
4
 Intra-financial assets are the holding of debt securities issued by other financial institutions (e.g. bank bonds); 
intra-financial liabilities are securities issued by insurance companies and held by other financial institutions.  
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Overall, as virtually all indicators have a volume component, the main factor determining the 
identification was size. It is therefore no surprise that the list of nine identified insurance 
companies corresponds on the whole to the world’s largest insurance companies as well as 
AIG, which, although its business volume had shrunk sharply following the crisis, had to be 
designated for political reasons given its role in the crisis.  
 
The regulatory strategy that the FSB has laid out for the implementation of insurance 
regulation foresees virtually the same three-pronged approach that was applied to banks: 
enhanced supervision at group level; the preparation of risk management and recovery plans; 
and the call for higher capital requirements for NTNI activities that are still to be defined.  
 
The parallelism between the FSB’s approaches to insurance and banking follows an 
interpretation of the financial crisis, according to which the banking sector was at the heart of 
the problem but the insurance sector would have been ‘the next in line’ if the authorities had 
not put an end to the systemic banking crisis. It is also inspired by the fact that a number of 
insurance companies came under strain and that the company AIG had become deeply 
intertwined with the banking sector through its subsidiary AIG Financial Products, which had 
extended guarantees on financial assets that allowed the banks to minimize their capital 
charge.  
 
2. Systemic risk analysis of banks and insurers  
 
The bulk of the academic literature has also treated insurers and banks largely in parallel. The 
reason is that the most influential papers essentially treat them as institutions trading and 
operating in financial markets and look at them from an investor perspective, rather than in 
terms of their business models. They examine how asset, debt and equity values, as well as 
leverage – generally defined as market value of equity over market value of assets – perform 
over time, differentiating between tranquil periods and periods of stress. The papers evaluate 
how patterns for a single institution evolve vis-à-vis the full sample or the market as a whole. 
It is from this approach that they derive notions of systemic risk.  
 
In this literature on systemic risk that includes insurers, three strands of research stand out.  
 
(1) The CoVaR approach 
 
The first strand is the so-called CoVaR (Conditional value-at-risk) approach, developed by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010). This approach estimates value-at-risk of individual 
institutions conditional on other institutions experiencing financial distress. The authors gauge 
an institution’s contribution to systemic risk as the increase in the value-at-risk across the 
entire financial sector, conditional on the individual institution being under distress. In simple 
terms, it is the degree to which one institution can put the sector under stress.5  
 
As the CoVaR approach focuses on the market values of individual financial institutions and 
does not capture more ‘structural’ parameters of assets and liabilities, such as their duration, 
composition or the underlying investment motive (e.g. trading vs hold-to-maturity 
investment), it lends itself to all types of financial institutions, including commercial banks, 
                                                          
5
 The difference between the CoVaR value conditional on the institution being in distress and the CoVaR value 
in the ‘normal’ state of the institution yields the marginal contribution of a particular institution to systemic risk.  
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investment banks, insurers and government sponsored enterprises, which are all treated on the 
same footing in the sample. 
 
The authors estimate CoVaR levels over time, including state variables such as market 
volatility, liquidity and credit spreads and the slope of the yield curve, and quantifying the 
extent to which size or leverage of institutions predict systemic risk contribution. They 
generally find that insurance groups display lower systemic risk levels than banks, but overall 
consider them part of the systemic interaction between financial institutions.   
 
(2) Systemic capital shortfall  
 
The second strand of research consists of estimating a ‘systemic expected shortfall’ (SES), 
defined as the propensity for any individual institution to be undercapitalized when the system 
as a whole is under stress. This approach has been developed in the seminal paper by 
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2011), and extended by Brownless and Engle 
(2011) and Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2012). The aim is to estimate the recapitalization 
need of a financial institution resulting from stress in the financial system. It can be expressed 
separately for any individual institution or as the institution’s loss in the tail of the aggregate 
sector's loss distribution, which the authors define as the firm’s ‘marginal expected shortfall’ 
(MES), a concept that has become a benchmark of systemic risk in the literature. 
 
Using the notation of Brownless and Engle (2011) and Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2012), 
who estimate systemic risk values for US and European financial institutions, respectively, 
the expected capital shortfall CS of firm i in case of systemic distress in period t is defined as: 
 
             [            |           ]          (1) 
where Ai and Wi denote the asset and equity values of firm i and  is a prudential ratio of 
equity to assets. As can be seen, such specification can be applied to any financial institution 
for which market values of assets and equity are available and which is traded in financial 
markets. The authors take a very wide sample of financial institutions including 
broker/dealers (i.e. investment banks), commercial banks, insurers and other financial 
institutions. They estimate the capital shortfall resulting from severe financial distress, 
proxying the latter by a large market decline (e.g. 40% decline, or cumulating a set of worst 
trading days in a year).   
 
The authors subsequently define systemic risk as a positive capital shortfall:  
 
                ሺ          ሻ         (2) 
and consider this measure as each institution’s expected contribution to systemic risk. The 
reasoning is that in periods of severe market distress, a capital shortfall cannot be maintained 
nor easily corrected as no investor will want to inject capital, so that the system as a whole 
comes under strain.  
 
Estimating such systemic risk values for a wide range of financial institutions, the authors 
generally find that investment banks and commercial banks lead the ranking, but they also 
find positive risk values for insurers, even though “insurance firms are overall the least 
systemically risky” (Acharya et al., p. 21). Within the group of insurers, the three insurance 
companies that have the highest risk profile were those heavily involved in providing 
financial guarantees for structured products in the credit derivatives area of the US market. 
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Brownless and Engle (2011) find that in terms of cross correlations among the various groups 
of financial firms (covering banks, broker/dealers, other non-depository institutions and 
insurers), “broker/dealers are the most correlated sector, insurance the least, and depository 
banks together with the other group lie in the middle”. 
 
(3) Network approach  
 
The third strand of literature aims at capturing the dynamic network relationship between 
financial institutions. The seminal paper is that by Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon (2011), 
who gauge network relationships in monthly returns of various types of financial institutions 
and examine co-movements through Granger analysis and principal components analysis. 
Their approach estimates empirically the degree and directions of connections between 
financial institutions.  
 
The authors find that between the 1990s and the period 2001-08, the Granger-causalities 
among 100 US financial institutions intensified, raising the stakes of systemic risk, and that 
banks played by far the most important role in transmitting shocks compared with other 
institutions. As regards insurers, their returns are particularly influenced by returns in banks 
and broker/dealers, and influence themselves the returns of both these types of institutions and 
hedge funds. The reason for the significant connectivity of the US insurance sector during that 
period is attributed in large part to the involvement of insurers in financial guarantee products.  
 
All these three important strands of research treat financial institutions from the investor 
perspective, examining asset, debt and equity developments over time and across sample. Yet 
a closer look at the business model and balance sheet structure reveals some important 
differences between insurance and banks, especially as regards capital and debt, which will be 
discussed in the subsequent section. As that section will show, while a capital shortfall might 
well represent an immediate source of systemic risk in banking, this is not the case in 
insurance; i.e. in the notation above, equation (1) applies to banking and insurance; equation 
(2) only to banking.  
 
 
III. Banks and insurance in systemic interaction compared  
 
This section elaborates on the main differences and similarities between banks and insurers 
with regard to their systemic interaction. It focuses on their business models and balance sheet 
structures, and discusses the different roles of capital and leverage in banking and insurance – 
two concepts at the heart of systemic regulation.  
 
1. Differences between banks and insurers with regard to their systemic role  
 
a. Institutional interconnectedness 
 
The first key difference between banks and insurers with regard to systemic risk is that banks 
operate within a system, namely the banking system, while insurers do not. Banks are 
institutionally interconnected; they operate through direct balance sheet exposure on each 
other in the form of unsecured and secured interbank lending.  
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These interconnections are very large, amounting to EUR 5.3 trillion in the euro area or 60% 
of GDP.6 These institutional interconnections are large not only for systemically important 
banks. To illustrate this point, take the example of Commerzbank of Germany, an ‘average’ 
large European institution but not on the FSB list: at end-2013, it held on its balance sheet 
EUR 88 billion claims on other banks, of which about one quarter overnight; and on the 
liability side it owed EUR 78 billion to other banks, again with a significant share overnight.7  
 
These direct and important interconnections between banking institutions are an intrinsic 
feature of banks’ operating model, and they serve as a protection against the liquidity risk that 
is paramount in banking (Allen and Gale, 2000). It is these direct institutional 
interconnections that establish the “banking system” – a structure of directly interrelated parts. 
The interconnections are highly fungible; they can be shifted, and are shifted, frequently 
among institutions and over the short term; moreover, they are often unsecured, essentially 
depending on trust. These interconnections and their fragility constitute the primary channel 
of transmission of shocks and systemic risk within the banking system.  
 
The fact that there is a “central bank” to which virtually all banks are connected and through 
which they obtain liquidity if needed, is yet a further aspect that demonstrates to which degree 
banks function, and can only function, within a system. The systemic interconnection through 
the central bank can be massive: during the crisis, the ECB lent up to €1,100 billion to the 
euro area banking system.  
 
Insurers are not institutionally interconnected; they are stand-alone operators in institutional 
terms (their interconnection via the financial market will be discussed below). For example, 
there is no direct balance sheet link between the systemically important insurance companies. 
Hence, there exists no “insurance system”, and no “central insurer” comparable to a central 
bank; insurers themselves are not counterparties in liquidity operations of the central bank. 
Hence, there is also no direct relationship of contagion among insurers as there is for banks.   
 
It is sometimes argued that insurers and reinsurers together constitute a system that resembles 
the banking system. But such a parallel overlooks the functions and size of reinsurers. 
Reinsurers are not first risk-takers at the same level of front-line insurers but act as backstop. 
This means that they are not transmitters but absorbers of risk materialization. In addition, the 
size of the links is far from what it is in banking. Insurers only pass on a fraction of their risk 
to reinsurers so that the linkages between the two levels are relatively limited. The world’s 
largest reinsurer, Munich Re, has a balance sheet of EUR 105 billion,8 a fraction of the 
balance sheet of the largest banks or central banks for that matter.  
 
b. Maturity transformation  
 
Banks engage in maturity transformation combined with leverage; they transform short-term 
liabilities into longer-term assets. As returns are usually rising with rising duration, banks 
have an incentive to stretch this duration gap outwards, as their expected return rises.  
 
                                                          
6
 Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, Table 2.1, Aggregate balance sheet of Euro area Monetary Financial 
Institutions (essentially banks). The figure does not include the holdings of securities issued by other banks, 
which amount to an additional EUR 1.6 trillion. 
7
 Commerzbank financial reporting, data for end-2013.  
8
 This is the balance sheet value of reinsurance activities, excluding Munich Re’s primary insurer Ergo.  
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Insurers do not engage in maturity transformation. They pursue a liability-driven investment 
approach, trying to match their asset profile with their liability profile. Asset-liability 
management (ALM) is a key function within insurance companies and an important strand of 
insurance economics. As insurers can estimate the duration of liabilities and assign 
probabilities to payouts, they will in principle seek to buy assets with a corresponding 
maturity, which also means that they generally can hold assets to maturity. A key measure of 
risk in insurance companies is the ALM mismatch or duration gap between assets and 
liabilities. A well-run insurance company will have an asset duration slightly shorter than its 
liability duration, in order to keep a liability buffer to face an increase in surrenders. Finally, 
since they are funded long-term, insurers are essentially “deep-pocket” investors. This makes 
them react very differently to downward market pressure compared with a short-term funded 
or leveraged investor.  
 
Related to that is the fact that for insurers the bulk of assets is subject to marking-to-market as 
most of insurers’ assets are quoted on large public markets and are highly liquid. The 
marking-to-market is a key element of Solvency II regulation and already applied by a wide 
range of large insurance companies. For banks, only parts of their financial assets are marked 
to market, whereas their banking book is not. Shocks to financial assets may thereby lead to 
delayed and enhanced reactions on the asset side for banks, once banking book valuations 
need to be adjusted, which is not the case for insurers.  
 
c. Liquidity risk  
 
The second key difference relates to the liquidity risk that is inherent in banking but not in 
insurance. Banks risk being liquidity-short; insurers are liquidity-rich. Deposits are the largest 
items on banks’ balance sheets. For the euro area, they amount to EUR 11 trillion or 120% of 
GDP. The largest deposit item are households deposits, amounting to EUR 6.3 trillion, of 
which the largest sub-item are overnight deposits amounting to EUR 2.5 trillion. No bank has 
enough buffers to stem such an outflow, and a risk of liquidity shortage can quickly translate 
from one bank to another; systemic risk and contagion usually start from liquidity.  
 
Hence, bank liabilities are predominantly short-term, withdrawable at will, and held 
exclusively by trust. Any weakening of such trust and the withdrawal of only a fraction of 
such liabilities would immediately put a bank under stress, have implications on the asset and 
capital structure and cascade through the entire banking system. This is the second key 
channel for the materialization of systemic risk. And even a small decline in deposits or a risk 
thereof, puts bank funding under strain, has an impact on credit provision and therefore has 
the potential to affect the real economy.  
 
Insurance liabilities are less fugitive. The liabilities for insurance of general protection, 
property, casualty and health are not callable at will. They relate to exogenous events that 
policy-holders do not influence.  
 
The part of liabilities that are theoretically callable concerns those parts of life insurance 
business that are not annuities (which cannot be withdrawn early at all). However, there are 
penalties for early withdrawal and tax benefits might vanish. In a crisis, where financial and 
economic uncertainty rise, it is also not evident that policy-holders would cancel life 
insurance policies that give them assurance of future incomes. In the global financial crisis, no 
such withdrawal was visible.  
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d. Money, credit and payment function  
 
The third key difference with regard to systemic risk that is hardly regarded in the literature, is 
that banks deal with the payment function, they create credit and their liabilities constitute 
money. This means that they are a means of payment and entail a public good function in a 
market economy.  
 
Of the entire stock of money within an economy, only a fraction – 10% in the euro area – is 
created by central banks, essentially banknotes. The overwhelming amount of money in a 
modern market economy, essentially consisting of deposits, is held and created by the 
commercial banking sector. For the euro area, the stock of money measured by M3 amounts 
to €9.9 trillion, of which 85% are bank deposits (March 2014).  
 
If the function of money and payments is impaired, this has immediate consequences for the 
economy. Banks create money through the credit multiplier process, they are the essential 
component in the monetary policy transmission mechanism and they organize the payment 
function. This is a unique role of the banking system.  
 
Insurers’ liabilities do not constitute money but represent an illiquid financial claim. 
Moreover, insurers do not provide essential financial market utilities and are less integrated 
into the financial market infrastructure. In particular, they are not an organizational part of the 
payments or settlement systems.  
 
Table 2. Banks and insurers: differences and similarities with regard to systemic interaction 
 Source: Author’s compilation.  
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2. Similarities between banks and insurers 
 
There are two important similarities between banks and insurers.  
 
a. The role as financial intermediaries  
 
Just like banks, insurers are financial intermediaries as far as their life insurance business lines 
are concerned. Their liabilities represent financial claims for policy holders, and their assets 
are predominantly financial assets. Insurers collect savings, intermediate between savers and 
investors, channel funds and fulfil a function of capital allocation in the economy. 
 
They are indeed important sources of funding for the real economy, also as a wide range of 
assets are eligible for them. This includes in particular infrastructure financing, which is 
attractive for insurers because of the long-term and secured nature of the investment. 
Empirically, default rates on infrastructure are significantly lower than on corporate bonds for 
example.  
 
Figure 2. Banks and insurers: stylized balance sheets and systemic linkages  
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
 
b. The role as investors  
 
Just like banks, insurance companies are large investors in financial markets. They receive 
insurance premia against a promise to cover adverse events and carry savings forward. The 
premia are invested in a diversified portfolio of assets, encompassing government and private-
sector bonds, equities, loans, infrastructure finance and other assets. Contrary to banks, 
insurers are not primarily lenders but investors, which means that they do not create financial 
claims but primarily purchase financial claims in the market. Insurers do not create money 
and credit, and hence do not fuel credit/debt cycles with risks of bubbles and bursts, and their 
capacity to add to financial bubbles is limited because they do not build up leverage and 
because their income stream from policy premia is comparatively gradual.  
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As investors, insurers seek a match between assets and liabilities, which is the main function 
of their asset-liability management and as they can choose the assets in view of their liability 
structure, their main concern is credit risk. With new regulation, in particular Solvency II, 
they will however move to a capital standard in which they mark-to-market their assets but 
are allowed to adjust their liability estimates in large part for short-term market volatility so 
that there are not major short-term fluctuations in capital.  
 
Taking the four differences and two similarities combined, insurers just as other non-banks 
are indeed not “funny-looking banks” as already pointed out by Elliott (2013) but they are 
simply not banks at all; they do not interact with the financial system like banks and therefore 
should not be regulated like banks as far as their systemic role is concerned. As it has been 
shown, in terms of financial structure, they are even the ‘contrary’ to banks in some 
dimensions, for example as concerns the asset-liability duration mismatch, the absence of 
liquidity risk and the duration of liabilities themselves. Whereas banks are in the business of 
facilitating leverage for other sectors, insurers are in the business of managing risk. This is 
why banks are more prone to be shock-transmitters, while insurers are more prone to be 
shock-absorbers.  
 
 
3. The roles of leverage, capital and loss-absorption capacity  
 
(1) The role of leverage  
The chief enemy of systemic risk control is leverage. The reason is that it reflects money 
created out of debt and follows cycles with typically much sharper downturns than upturns.9 It 
is the propensity to finance risky activities by borrowing, which links asset returns that are 
uncertain with obligations that are certain. In tranquil states of the world, this strategy is 
profitable, collecting return premia, but in uncertain states, the relationship turns, and 
leveraged institutions come under strain. If the turn affects a broad range of assets and 
persists, the entire financial system is risking default. Clearly, the high degree of leverage in 
the global financial system was seen as the key factor triggering and aggravating the crisis 
(World Bank, 2009).  
Leverage is inherent in banking and quasi-absent in insurance. “Banking is all about 
leverage”, writes Stefan Ingves, Chair of the Basel Committee for Bank Supervision. “Banks 
are highly leveraged financial institutions that are in the business of facilitating leverage for 
others” (Ingves, 2014, p. 1). While for industrial companies, the share between debt and 
equity funding of assets is typically about 50:50,10 for some banks before the crisis, this ratio 
had been 98:2.  
In economic terms the leverage ratio is mostly defined by the relation of borrowed funds over 
own funds, i.e. debt to equity; yet, it has become convention to define it as assets to equity (or 
its inverse). For banks, this approximation is possible because the share of equity-financed 
assets is small and because on the liability side all what is not equity is either financial debt or 
debt vis-à-vis depositors, which is even shorter term.  
                                                          
9
 For a fascinating exposition of short and long debt cycles, written by a practitioner and founder of the world’s 
largest hedge fund, see Dalio (2014).  
10
 Average of Apple, Exxon Mobil, Google, PetroChina, General Electric, Wal-Mart Stores, IBM, Microsoft, 
Nestlé and Chevron (Ingves, 2014).  
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For insurers, the largest liability consists of policy-holder reserves. The fallacy in applying a 
bank leverage ratio to insurance consists of treating policy-holder reserves akin to short-term 
financial debt, which they are not. Applying a bank-type leverage ratio would equate the 
banks’ debt-financed purchase of assets with the insurers’ premia-funded purchase of assets. 
The important point is that in insurance, there is a functional link between the two, established 
through an asset-liability management whose objective is to avoid undue maturity mismatch. 
Moreover, insurers do not raise debt to purchase financial assets to cover liabilities towards 
policy-holders.  
Yet, insurers do issue and hold debt. They do so mainly to finance mergers and acquisitions, 
and to a lesser extent to establish a cash buffer if needed or buy fixed assets (buildings, etc.). 
Hence, the main counterparts of insurers’ debt on the asset side are goodwill, cash or fixed 
assets.  
Therefore, for insurers a leverage ratio would better not be defined as equity over assets but as 
equity over debt, or the inverse, which is often referred to as the gearing ratio.11  
If one were to measure the leverage of insurers by relating their equity to their total balance 
sheet, one would only obtain a measure of their business mix: if they write short tail business 
like property, they will have a small balance sheet and the ratio will be low; if they write long 
tail business like annuities, the ratio will be high. Hence, such a ratio would reflect their 
business mix, not their riskiness. 
What is the link with systemic regulation? For banks, capital surcharges can actually control 
leverage because they slow the asset acquisition, also by slowing credit growth; this is the 
process of deleveraging. Insurers can reduce the debt gearing but they cannot reduce their 
insurance assets because this would imply to cancel insurance contracts with existing policy-
holders that is generally not allowed. For these reasons, in the case of insurers the notion of 
leverage, or controlling leverage, is by far not as pertinent as in the case of banking. 
 
(2) The role of capital  
 
The lynchpin of bank systemic regulation is capital. Higher capital requirements are the key 
policy lever for the control of systemically important banks. Such higher capital requirements 
are effective in addressing systemic risk for banks because in addition to restraining leverage, 
they raise the costs of balance sheet growth and augment the immediate loss absorption 
capacity of individual institutions to shocks, which in turn limits the pass-through of such 
shocks to the system. This is the key reasoning for why higher capital requirements are a tool 
to internalize systemic risk.  
 
Higher capital ratios also help improve a bank’s ratings and access to the funding market. All 
other factors being equal, a bank with higher capital ratios will have better market access in 
particular in periods of stress and is therefore less prone to require recourse to public 
backstops of whatever sort.  
 
The relationship between capital and liquidity risk or depositor protection is only indirect. 
Liquidity risk is addressed by specific regulation, such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in 
Basel III, and the prime tool for depositor protection are deposit insurance schemes. However, 
to the extent that liquidity risks are beginning to materialize, for example by an incipient 
                                                          
11
 In the same vein, rating agencies measure the leverage of insurers by dividing their debt by their equity and by 
comparing their debt to their pre-tax earnings.  
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withdrawal of deposits, capital can help stem an initial outflow by helping to tap market 
funding or central bank recourse, for which sufficient capital levels are a precondition. While 
robust capital levels do not protect depositors directly, they can be seen as providing a first 
protection against deposit outflows or other liquidity shortages.  
 
In insurance, capital has a very different role (for an excellent overview see Platin and Rochet, 
2007). It serves essentially to ensure that the last policy-holder is being paid. First all assets 
are wound down, which typically can take many years,12 and to be sure that there enough 
assets to cover eventually all liabilities also under adverse market conditions, regulators 
demand more assets than liabilities from the outset, which is what establishes capital. Hence, 
whereas in banking, capital enters the sequence of adverse events at the beginning, in 
insurance it enters the sequence of adverse events at the end.  
 
This difference has an important implication for systemic regulation because it changes the 
effectiveness of capital surcharges. Raising capital levels for banks increases their buffer to 
withstand shocks and therefore helps avoid that a chain of systemic contagion unravels. It also 
reduces the likelihood of adverse shocks ex ante, by reducing leverage, and thus the 
propensity to cycles of bubbles and crashes.13 
 
Raising capital for insurers, in contrast, essentially means that there are (even) more assets 
available to cover the liability stream than otherwise, but such additional capital will be 
consumed, if at all, at the end of the process and has no crisis prevention or stabilization 
function.  
 
Regulators recognize this important difference and therefore envisage requiring more capital 
only for so-called ‘non-traditional’ insurance activities. Depending on the ultimate definition, 
the scope may represent a significant share of insurers’ balance sheets and be not far from 
overall capital surcharges applied to banks. These activities have not yet been conclusively 
defined; so far, several compilations exist, listing mainly variable annuity products with 
certain guarantees, financial guarantee products, securities lending, and other activities. 
 
Interconnectedness is also a concern to regulators and is sometimes considered to be 
addressed through higher capital requirements, to reduce the degree of interconnectedness. 
Obviously, if capital surcharges were prohibitive, such activities could not be undertaken. But 
short of being prohibitive, capital surcharges may not be effective; hence, if an activity – in 
the form of ‘non-traditional’ or in the form giving rise to unwarranted interconnectedness – 
were to give rise to systemic risk, measures other than capital surcharges may be more 
appropriate to address them. Only such other measures, and not capital surcharges, would 
have been effective in preventing the AIG debacle, resulting from an unregulated financial 
subsidiary in London engaging in financial guarantees and credit enhancements of subprime 
                                                          
12
 UK Equitable, for example, had to be wound down and has been in runoff for years. Policy-holders are served 
from the asset pool just as if the insurance company was active. 
13
 There is another fundamental point regarding the role of capital in prudential regulation. Policy holder 
protection can be enhanced through demanding more capital on top of calculated technical reserves, or by 
strengthening the demands on the calculation of reserves themselves. Continental European supervisors have 
traditionally focused their attention on the adequacy of technical reserves, which represent 90% or more of 
liabilities, whereas UK or US supervisors have focused more on capital. It is important to recall that the prime 
emphasis of insurance supervision should be on the adequacy of technical reserves or provisions themselves, less 
on capital, as the latter is merely an additional buffer in case reserves have been underestimated. 
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products. Eventually, AIG required $180 billion in support from the Federal Reserve and US 
Treasury. This is yet another illustration of how unrealistic effective – or, put differently, how 
ineffective realistic – capital surcharges would be.  
 
This, however, requires a very careful definition in the first place so as to avoid wrongly 
classifying insurance products with certain guarantee components that provide an important 
value for policy-holders and society at large (and whose guarantees can be hedged). It also 
requires not confusing the use of derivatives for hedging purposes with that for engaging in 
leverage.  
 
For example, one source of interconnectedness is identified as the holding of bank bonds by 
insurers (IAIS, 2013). Applying higher capital charges related to such securities’ holdings 
would indeed lower their return but not eliminate such interconnectedness. And higher capital 
charges would also not stem the potential unravelling of such interconnectedness through the 
potentially rapid sales of such bonds in the case of a crisis. If cross-sector holdings were a 
major concern, such holdings could be limited as a share of the balance sheet, rather than 
being made more expensive. Having said that, it should be noted that the problem of cross-
holdings of securities across the two sectors was not identified as an issue in the regulation of 
banks and did not lead to limits or surcharges there.  
 
(3) Loss absorption capacity  
There is a third factor that has a bearing on the absorption of systemic risk, and which this 
time is specific for insurance. For banks, the loss absorbency on the liability side is mostly 
confined to the equity tranche. There have been recent market and regulatory initiatives to 
raise the degree of loss absorption through debt contracts converting into equity (conditional 
convertibles) and through the formalization of bail-in rules allowing for the write-down of 
subordinated debt. In Europe, this is foreseen in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
that is currently in the final stages of legal adoption. The double motivation of these steps is to 
limit the pass-through from shocks to individual institutions to the system and to protect even 
more effectively the depositors.  
In insurance, the bail-in is built in: there is an inherent loss absorption capacity in the form of 
beneficiary participation in a significant part of life insurance contracts. In these contracts 
policy-holders participate in the gains and losses of the investment linked to their policies. 
Hence, there is a built-in loss absorbency function in insurance on top of the equity tranche. 
The loss absorbency resulting from participating contracts does not affect all policy-holder 
reserves. Property and casualty insurance contracts are all excluded; policy-holders need the 
same damage protection independent of investment performance. The loss absorption 
concerns specific life insurance contracts allocated to the insurers’ ‘General account’ that are 
prevalent in most countries, and they apply to insurance contracts of so-called unit linked 
accounts. Loss absorption is quite significant and likely to amount to between one third and 
one half of life insurance underwriting of an average European insurer. This loss absorption 
limits the propensity for ‘fire sales’ feared by authorities as one issue of interconnectedness. 
For example, in the Greek debt restructuring, about 80% of the losses of some European 
insurance companies were passed through to policy-holders.  
Hence, insurers have achieved what is currently considered for banks, a partial loss absorption 
capacity of liabilities beyond equity, i.e. a form of bail-in. 
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IV. Broader questions about systemic regulation  
 
Differences in business model and balance sheet structure, especially with regard to capital 
and leverage, are key to understanding the differences in the systemic interaction of banks and 
insurers with the rest of the financial system. But there are also other key issues still open.  
 
Even though there is not a single dominant definition of systemic risk, there is a broad 
common understanding of the concept (for a recent overview, see Eling and Pankoke, 2012). 
This can be summarized as the risk of system-wide distress and economic damage. The 
system-wide distress has sometimes been defined as the failure of a significant part of 
financial institutions (Acharya et al., 2011; De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000); as correlated 
defaults of financial institutions over a short period of time (Billio et al., 2010); as an 
impairment of the financial system (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011); as the malfunctioning 
of the entire financial system (Bach and Nyuyen, 2012; Rodriguez-Moreno and Pena (2013); 
or as the loss of economic value or widespread loss of confidence in the financial system 
(Baur et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2013; Cummins and Weiss, 2011 and 2013; Weiss and 
Mühlnickel, 2013). 
 
The economic fallout has been consistently described as a negative effect on credit supply, 
withdrawal of liquidity or negative effects on the economy. As these terms illustrate, the main 
focus has been on banking, and less on non-bank financial institutions.  
 
There are still a number of open questions that will resurface in the debate about insurers. 
These are all issues that warrant close considerations in the period ahead and many of them 
still need clarification.  
 
1. Which system and which channels of transmission?  
 
What is the system that the notion of systemic risk actually refers to? The preceding section 
has shown that the answer “the financial system” is no longer sufficiently granular because of 
different types of financial institutions and fundamentally different types of interactions 
among them.14 In particular, for the reasons discussed above, banks can be seen as 
representing a “system within the system”, and the transmission of shocks within this “inner 
circle” constituted by the banking system is fundamentally different compared with other 
financial institutions in the “outer circle”.  
 
The distinction between the banking system as inner circle and non-bank financial institutions 
in an outer circle, linked to the financial system mainly through their financial market 
investments is consistent with a number of empirical findings. The large and potentially 
vulnerable interconnections within the banking system have motivated recent research to use 
network analysis to capture these interconnections and analyze the channels of systemic risk 
(European Central Bank, 2010; Halaj and Kok, 2013). These studies cover only banks and 
explain how interbank interactions can be described as a network. In their study of 
interconnectedness, which includes several types of institutions, Billio et al. (2012) find that 
banks play by far the most important role in transmitting shocks compared with other 
institutions.  
 
                                                          
14
 Zigrand (2014) provides an insightful and comprehensive analysis of systems in finance and economics.  
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Therefore, when it comes to designing regulatory measures, the generic description of 
systemic risk needs to be complemented by an analysis of transmission channels. Such 
analysis must encompass three steps: identifying the source of vulnerability; elaborating 
channels of transmission to other financial institutions; and elaborating the transmission to the 
real economy.  
 
For banks these three steps can broadly be described as follows. First, the primary source of 
vulnerability is given by the combination of fugitive liabilities combined with stickier long-
term assets as a result of maturity transformation; it is thus liquidity risk that can trigger 
solvency risks. Second, their transmission to the banking system predominantly occurs 
through the institutional interconnectedness to other banks which are short-term, callable at 
will and largely based on trust. Third, the transmission to the real economy can occur through 
a combination of a fall in the trust in the safety of deposits, disruptions to the payment 
function of money, and/or the credit provision. The fact that banks are investors in financial 
markets and financial intermediaries can aggravate the transmission of financial risk, but they 
are dwarfed in importance by the bank’s specific channels listed earlier. 
 
For insurers, none of the bank-specific channels apply. Liabilities represent no means of 
payment, are less fugitive and mostly longer-term, assets are broadly matched and 
institutional interconnectedness is not given. The sole potential channel of transmission is in 
the role of financial intermediary and investor. Here, an insurer like any large investor, facing 
challenges in asset management, might be able to contribute to strain in the financial system. 
If that is the case, the solution to containing risk may lie less in the nature of the institution 
than in the nature and functioning of financial markets or the nature of the accounting.15 In 
any event, the issue of transmission channels of insurance-originated systemic risk is still 
open.  
 
2. Which direction of risk?  
 
There is still confusion whether the focus is on a “firm-to-system” or “system-to-firm” 
perspective, or both. Yet, the policy implications of the two perspectives are not identical.  
 
The first perspective concentrates on the risk that the failure of a firm causes system distress; 
the second one, on the risk that a firm cannot withstand systemic stress and would require 
recapitalization, which in stressed market conditions may not be available and then cascade 
onto the system. Policy-makers mostly focus on the first perspective, researchers mostly on 
the second one.  
 
The discussion about systemically important banks focuses strongly on the “firm-to-system” 
perspective. It is related to the fear that some institutions are too-big-to-fail because their 
failure would cause widespread distress to the financial system. For insurers, the debate has 
mostly focused on the possibility of fire sales. Yet, the risks that insurers are exposed to, is 
not correlated with capital market risks but rather lies in the areas of natural catastrophes, 
questions in the life insurance model during periods of low interest rates or other drain on 
insurers’ liquidity. Hence, there is no clear firm-to-system channel.  
                                                          
15
 In the last two equity market crises (2002-03 and 2008-09) the marking-to-market of assets (in IFRS and US-
GAAP), combined with the stress tests applied to insurers by regulators and supervisors in times of market 
distress, have had a procyclical effect in forcing insurers to sell holdings of equities to protect their solvency, 
whereas in previous crises they were more able to act as holder of long-term assets of last resort.  
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Insurers can hypothetically be subject to liquidity withdrawals although these are only partly 
possible and, to the extent that they are possible, they are likely to be rather gradual. They are 
only partly possible because a large fraction is linked with adverse events in property and 
casualty insurance that policy-holders will not inflict on themselves; they are likely to be 
rather gradual since cancellations of life insurance contracts are often not in the interest for 
policy-holders as they would lose the benefit for which they took the insurance in the first 
place, be it for annuities, a benefit for their survivors or a tax advantage. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the overall process is far more orderly than in the case of banks.  
 
3. Systemic risk or a systemic role? 
 
There is also still a need of clarification whether the focus is on systemic risk, i.e. negative 
spillovers between individual institutions and the system, or on systemic roles, i.e. the 
provision of essential services in the financial system or the economy. The latter implies that 
systemically important institutions are those whose viability is deemed crucial for the 
functioning of the financial system and/or economy. Again, policy implications from the two 
approaches are not the same.  
 
It is clear that that insurance companies provide an important service to the real economy. 
They help firms, households and public sector entities to manage risks they face, including the 
support to households on long-term income through life insurance products. It is less evident 
that insurance companies provide a systemic service within the financial sector more broadly 
such as market infrastructures do or as banks do in the payment system. Therefore, the 
systemic importance for the economy may be more straightforward to identify than the 
systemic importance for the financial system. The financial system would function without 
insurers, the economy would not.  
 
 
V. Conclusion  
To understand the difference between banking and insurance, one has to start from the 
liability side of the balance sheet and, more specifically, from the comparison of bank 
deposits with insurance liabilities. Bank deposits represent a ‘monolithic’ block of 
homogenous claims whose predominant maturity is zero; insurance liabilities represent a set 
of highly heterogeneous claims whose average maturity is several years. In the first case, an 
expectation of withdrawals or payouts over time cannot be formed; in the latter case, actuarial 
methods have at their heart the calculation of expected runoffs. 
 
Several consequences follow from this important distinction, including that insurers can 
conduct asset-liability management to harmonize their asset and liability structures, and focus 
mostly on longer-term and hold-to-maturity investments. This is very different from banks, 
which seek returns through maturity transformation.  
 
This paper has aimed at elaborating the main differences and similarities between insurance 
and banking with regard to systemic interaction and highlighted the differences in institutional 
interconnectedness, liquidity risk, payments function and maturity transformation. It has also 
elaborated on the different roles of leverage and capital between both sectors. In contrast with 
banking, capital in insurance serves directly the protection of the last policy-holders, and it 
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serves much less to desire to access capital markets to fund asset purchases or obtain 
temporary liquidity support, nor does it serve the controlling of leverage. 
 
Therefore, the paper has raised the question of whether capital surcharges motivated by fears 
of systemic risk would have a justification in insurance as they may have in banking. In case 
certain activities gave rise to systemic risk, the question therefore arises whether regulatory 
responses other than capital surcharges would be more appropriate. Such responses would 
have to be targeted at the activities under consideration and might range from prohibitions, 
e.g. of activities providing financial guarantees as did AIG, investment limits (e.g. if the 
holding of bank bonds was a concern due to interconnectedness) or changes to the design of 
insurance contracts (e.g. on withdrawal limits to slow a possible sudden withdrawal over 
time). Also consolidated solvency capital requirements and supervision by the supervisor of 
the group holding company, which still does not exist in the US, would be relevant measures. 
 
More broadly, the paper has aimed at highlighting the different roles of banks and insurance 
in the financial system and their different degrees of interaction with that system. These 
differences are fundamental. The reason is that banks are constitutive of the financial system 
in general and the payment system in particular; the financial system cannot be conceived 
without banks. Insurers use the financial system as well as the payment system, but the system 
can exist and function without them. 
 
These relationships are different as far as the economy is concerned: both banks and insurers 
are essential for modern market economies, whose functioning cannot be envisaged without 
either of them: banks for their role in the handling of money and payments, and the extension 
of credit; insurers for their role in the management of risk.  
 
Banks are often equated with financial institutions and therefore “systemic risk in the 
financial system” is mostly meant to mean the banking system. It is therefore a logical fallacy 
to conclude that insurers, being financial institutions, are part of the systemic risk sources and 
channels just like banks.  
 
Insurers no doubt have a systemic role for the functioning of the economies; whether they can 
indeed originate and create systemic risk in the financial system is an issue that is still to be 
demonstrated. The comprehensive systemic risk study by the US Treasury’s Office of 
Financial Research stresses the importance of four L’s in systemic crises: linkages, liquidity, 
leverage and losses (Bisias et al. 2012). This paper has tried to demonstrate that these four 
issues need to be conceived in a fundamentally different way in insurance than in banking.  
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